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the period of accrual should commence with the day the tax lien attaches under state
law. The fact that the parties in the principal case prorated the taxes with reference
to the period beginning with the date of assessment 20 and that such appears to be the
common accounting practice 2 lends support to a rule that the period of ratable accrual
shall begin with the date of assessment.
Taxation-Property Subject to Taxation-Validity of State Tax on Dividends
Declared by Foreign Corporations-[Federal].-The plaintiff, a Delaware corporation
doing a nation-wide business, declared a dividend payable at its main office in New
York out of general corporate funds. The state of Wisconsin assessed a tax on the corporation pursuant to a state statute imposing a tax on all corporations "for the privilege of declaring and receiving dividends out of income derived from property located
and business transacted in the state."' The tax of 2 per cent was to be deducted by
the corporation from dividends payable to both resident and non-resident stockholders.2 The plaintiff filed objections to the assessment claiming the statute was unconstitutional. On an appeal from a judgment of the trial court sustaining the assessment,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held the tax invalid, one judge dissenting.3 On certiorari, to the United States Supreme Court, held, that the statute is to be construed
as levying a supplementary income tax on the income of the corporation paid out in
dividends, and is justified in view of the benefits conferred by the state on the corporation. Reversed and remanded. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co.4
exempt only income items. However, the characteristic difference between capital and income
items is that the former is computed as of a given instant, the latter with reference to a period
of time. z Paul and Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § S.o6 (1934). The court's theory
makes the taxes less of a capital item only in that it makes the taxes accrue twice rather than
once a year.
20 It appears that in Cum. Bull. of Treas. Dept. Rul. 1939-1 at 168, the taxpayer-purchaser
there involved also prorated the taxes from the date of assessment to the date of purchase.
Whether the date of assessment shall be taken to mean the date as of which the value of the
property is determined and the taxpayer lists his property or the date when the state tax commissioners fix the final values is of secondary importance. The former date is at present chosen
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for determining when the taxpayer's liability for
the tax of the fiscal year then beginning accrues. Cum. Bull of Treas. Dept. Rul. 1939-2, at
82; 1938-I, at 132; X-2, at 142 (1931).
21 1

Paul and Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 11.74 (1934); United States v. Ander-

U.S. 422 (1926).
Wis. Stat. (I939) c. 71.6o, §3(1). The amount of corporate income attributable to Wisconsin is determined in the same manner as under the provisions of the Wisconsin income tax
law. Ibid., § 3(4). See Wis. Stat. (i937) c. 71.02(3)(d).
2 Wis. Stat. (1937) c. 71.6o, § 3(1). The rate has since been raised to 3 per cent. Wis. Stat.
son,
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(1939) c. 71-60, § 3(I).
3 J. C. Penney Co. v. Wisconsin, 233 Wis. 286, 289 N.W. 677 (194o), noted in 24 Minn. L.
Rev. 711 (1940).
4 61 S. Ct. 246 (I94O). Four justices dissented. The court similarly disposed of two companion cases. Wisconsin v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 61 S. Ct. 253 (1940); Wisconsin v.

F. W. Woolworth Co., 61 S. Ct. 395 (1940). Petitions for rehearing were denied in all three
cases, 6i S. Ct. 444 (194o).
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The validity of the "Privilege Dividend Tax" as applied to foreign corporations
was first treated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State ex rel. FroedtertG. & M. Co.
v. Tax Cam'n.s The court upheld the tax as an excise upon a transaction involving
funds which, because of their local derivation, retained a "constructive situs" in the
state. Two years later the United States Supreme Court in Connecticut Gen'l Life Ins.
Co. V. Johnson,6 declared invalid a California franchise tax on corporations licensed to
do business in the state, which included in its measure reinsurance premiums received
from out-of-state transactions that dealt solely with California risks on which the
insurance premiums were paid in California. The court reasoned that a state may not
levy an excise tax on transactions beyond its borders since the power of the state to
regulate the privilege of the corporation to do business within the state does not extend
to such transactions, regardless of the local source of the property involved in the extraterritorial transaction. By construing the "Privilege Dividend Tax" as an excise,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the Connecticut General case authority for holding
the tax invalid in the instant case since the dividends were declared in New York and
the privilege of declaring dividends was granted to the corporation by Delaware, the
state of incorporation, and not by Wisconsin.
If the tax were construed as a property tax the question of whether the income resulting from Wisconsin operations retained a "constructive situs" in Wisconsin would
be relevant.7 Neither the Wisconsin Supreme Court nor the United States Supreme
Court adopted this interpretation of the statute however. Recent decisions indicate
that local derivation of intangibles without more is not sufficient to give such intangibles a situs within the state for the purpose of property taxation. 8
The United States Supreme Court interpreted the dividend tax as supplementary
to the Wisconsin income tax program. Since it is well-settled that a state has jurisdiction to tax a foreign corporation for income earned within its borders,9 the tax when
so construed meets no constitutional barriers. In view of the provision that the amount
of the tax is to be deducted from the dividends disbursed to the stockholders, however,
it would appear that the income of the stockholder rather than the income of the corporation is being taxed. While a state may constitutionally tax the income of a nonresident individual earned within its borders,"° this principle cannot be extended to
cover non-resident stockholders of foreign corporations without disregarding the corN.W.
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7 See Froedtert G. & M. Co. v. Tax Com'n, 221 Wis. 225, 235, 265 N.W. 672, 676 (1936);
Graniteville Mfg. Co. v. Query, 283 U.S. 376 (i93i); People ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 184
N.Y. 431, 448, 77 N.E. 970, 975 (i9o6), aff'd 204 U.S. 152 (1907).
8 Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board, 307 U.S. 313 (1939); Connecticut Gen'l Life Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); cf. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936);
Smith v. Ajax Pipe Line Co., 87 F. (2d) 567 (C.C.A. 8th 1937) where a business situs for intangibles at a place other than the owner's domicile was declared to have been established.
9Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); United States Glue Co.
v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918). Wisconsin imposes a general corporate income tax. Wis.
Stat. (1939) c. 71.01.
10Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920). Where the income tax is levied on the earnings of
a non-resident employee within the taxing state, provision may validly be made for collecting
the tax from the employer. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 6o (1920).
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porate entity. xx The issue of whether the tax is levied against the stockholder or against
the corporation is not clearly raised where, as in the present case, a corporation has
only one class of stock outstanding.X2 Where, however, a corporation has a class of
preferred stock outstanding the issue becomes clearer. If the tax is declared to be one
on the corporation, the provision that the tax "shall be deducted and withheld from
such dividends payable to residents and non-residents by the payor corporation"'3
must be construed as requiring deduction of the tax before final allocation of the dividends to the various classes of stock, so that the preferred shareholder's dividend will
not be diminished. X4 Under such an interpretation the corporation and not the shareholder would be entitled to deductions under both state and federal income tax laws.
If, however, the proper interpretation of this section requires the tax to be deducted
after dividends have been allocated to the various classes, the tax must be deducted
from the preferred dividends as well as from the common. A ruling of the United States
Treasury Department so construed the tax and decided that the stockholder and not
the corporation was entitled to the income tax deduction.' s It would seem anomalous
that Wisconsin should be permitted to disregard the corporate entity for the sake of
imposing this tax, while at the same time continuing to recognize the corporate entity
x6
in other tax measures.
To discover the purpose of this tax it is helpful to consider it in the light of the Wisconsin tax structure in which it is placed. Wisconsin imposes an income tax on all corporations doing business in the state measured by the amount of their earnings attributable to Wisconsin.X7 Wisconsin exempts from personal income taxation dividends paid to the shareholder by corporations earning 5o per cent or more of their net
income in Wisconsin. 8 Until the imposition of the "Privilege Dividend Tax" stockholders of Wisconsin corporations paid no income tax on dividends although dividends
paid to resident stockholders of foreign corporations were taxed. With the growing
need for additional revenue, inclusion of dividends of domestic corporations as income
subject to personal taxation became advisable. But if this were done, investment in
local corporations would lose tax advantages over investment in foreign corporations.
For this reason it appears that Wisconsin may have wished to impose an additional
tax on the dividend income of resident stockholders of foreign corporations. By imposing a tax on dividends payable to non-resident stockholders of both local and foreign
corporations the state could tap a source of revenue that would otherwise be lost, and
at the same time spread the tax among all who ultimately profited from the protection
"tCases indicate that legislative attempts to trace ownership of corporate property to the
shareholder for the purpose of imposing a tax on the shareholder are invalid. Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U.S. 69, 83 (1926); Domenech v. United Porto Rican Sugar
Co., 62 F. (2d) 552 (C.C.A. ist 1932), cert. den. 289 U.S. 739 (1933); Klein v. Board of Tax
Supervisors, 282 U.S. ig (i93o); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Com'n, 282 U.S. 1 (1930).
2Brief of respondent at 14.
'3

Wis. Stat. (1939) c. 7r.6o, § 3(3).

'4

Cf. Harding, State Jurisdiction to Tax Dividends and Stock Profits to Natural Persons,

25 Calif. L. Rev. 139, 158-63 (1937).
's Brief of respondent in support of petition for rehearing at 17; Income Tax Unit 3oo2
Cumulative Bulletin, XV-2, p. 142 (r936).
16Note i i supra.
'7Wis. Stat. (1939) c. 7r.oi.
ISWis. Stat. (1939) c. 71.03(5).
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afforded the corporate enterprise by Wisconsin. This result could have been achieved,
however, within the framework of prior decisions by providing that the tax be measured by the amount of dividends declared but that payment be made out of corporate
surplus and need not be deducted from dividends. x9 By upholding the tax in its present
form the Supreme Court has again indicated its tendency to refuse to invalidate any
state tax which is reasonably related to benefits conferred by the state as long as discriminatory burdens are not imposed on interstate commerce.2°
19 Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (193r); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp,
308 U.S. 33 (i939). Itis concededly proper for a state to use as a measure of taxation property
which is itself not subject to taxation. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S.
412 (i937). The fact that the tax is imposed only after a transaction occurs outside the state
is not a bar. Continental Assurance Co. v. Tennessee, 61 S. Ct. i (i94o); Maxwell v. Bugbee,
250 U.S. 525 (IgIg).
20 Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Graves v. Elliot, 307 U.S. 383 (1939); Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (i937).

